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TORTS
ELLEN M. KELLY, ESQ.* and ANDY THOMAS**

INTRODUCTION
During the abbreviated Survey period, New Mexico courts decided
cases addressing the duties of law enforcement officers and the duty of
disclosure in medical malpractice cases. Other decisions looked at employer liability for intentional acts of employees, liability of landowners
to firemen on their property, construction of New Mexico's Release Act,
and whether a cause of action exists against an insurance liability carrier
for negligent failure to settle a claim against its insured. Procedural questions include the application of the notice and limitations provisions of
The Tort Claims Act. The unaddressed issue lurking in several of the
survey cases is how liability should be apportioned in situations where
both an intentional act by one person and a negligent act by another are
proximate causes of an injury.'
I. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
In Keithley vs. St. Joseph's Hospital,2 the court of appeals held that
the physician's and hospital's duty to a patient to disclose material information concerning his treatment extends beyond the patient's death. 3
In this particular case, the court found the duty was owed to the patient's
wife once her husband died.
Mr. Keithley underwent external beam radiation therapy in 1977. He
died in 1978, allegedly due to excessive dosages of radiation. His widow
did not sue until 1983, after the three-year statute of limitation had expired.4 She claimed she could not sue earlier because the doctors and
*J.D. 1980, University of New Mexico. Presently with Civerolo, Hansen & Wolf, P.A.
**Member, Class of 1986, University of New Mexico, School of Law.
1. See infra notes 14-22, 55-61 and accompanying text.
2. 102 N.M. 565, 698 P.2d 435 (Ct. App. 1984), cert. quashed, 102 N.M. 565, 698 P.2d 435
(1985).
3. Id. at 572, 698 P.2d at 442.
4. Id. at 568, 698 P.2d at 438. The Medical Malpractice Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§41-5-1 to -28
(Repl. Pamp. 1982) establishes a three-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions.
Id. §41-5-13.
In Armijo v. Tandysh, 98 N.M. 181, 646 P.2d 1245 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. quashed, 98 NM.
336, 648 P.2d 794, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982), the court rejected the argument that the
Act's statute of limitations only applies to "qualified" health care providers. The limitation of actions
is not one of the "benefits" available to qualified providers in § 41-5-5 and therefore runs against
any provider.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

hospital had prevented her by concealment of the allegedly excessive dose
and by misrepresenting the effects of the radiation from realizing that she
might have had an action.5
Physicians and hospitals owe their patients a fiduciary duty "to disclose
all material information concerning the patient's treatment. 6 If the doctor
or hospital has knowledge of malpractice, the duty can be breached by
misrepresentation of the patient's condition, concealment of a problem
from the patient, or the mere failure to disclose information about the
problem. 7 The running of the statute of limitations may be tolled if the
health care provider fraudulently conceals information about a problem
resulting from the treatment. 8
In reversing the summary judgment for defendants, the court of appeals
rejected their contention that the fiduciary relationship, and, therefore,
the duty to disclose, terminated upon the patient's death. The court reasoned that the position urged by defendants would mean "patients who
are merely injured would be in a better position to assert rights against
a health-care provider than survivors of the more egregiously injured
patients who die from their injuries." 9 Finding the incongruity unacceptable, the court held that the duty to inform survived the patient and
was owed to the nearest relative.'o
The Keithley court determined there were factual issues about what the
doctors and hospital knew. Without saying so, the court apparently thought
that because the evidence could be seen as establishing that the defendants
should have known of mistakes, it also could act as circumstantial evidence that the defendants did know of a problem. " This was a particularly
5. Keithley, 102 N.M. at 570, 698 P.2d at 440. The doctors had talked to Mrs. Keithley while
her husband was receiving the radiation treatments, and she was listed as the next of kin on the
hospital's forms. Id. at 572, 698 P.2d at' 442. There would have been no difficulty in this instance
ascertaining who should be contacted about problems connected with her husband's treatment, even
after Mr. Keithley died. The court did not address how diligent the doctor or hospital had to be in
trying to locate the patient or next of kin if the addresses were not readily available.
6. Id. at 569, 698 P.2d at 439.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 569, 698 P.2d at 439; Garcia v. Presbyterian Hospital Center, 92 N.M. 652, 655, 593
P.2d 487, 490(Ct. App. 1974); Hardin v. Farris, 87 N.M. 143, 146, 530 P.2d 407, 410 (Ct. App.
1974). Two additional rules came out of these earlier cases: (I) mere silence constitutes concealment
in a fiduciary relationship and (2) concealment does not create a separate cause of action in malpractice
cases. Hardin, 87 N.M. at 146, 530 P.2d at 410. The "mere silence" rule appears to be reaffirmed
in Keithley, 102 N.M. at 571, 698 P.2d at 441.
9. Keithley, 102 N.M. at 572, 698 P.2d at 442.
10. Id. Another decision during the Survey period, Mackey v. Burke, 102 N.M. 294, 694 P.2d
1359 (Ct. App. 1984), cert. quashed, 102 N.M. 293, 694 P.2d 1358 (1985), held a wrongful death
action under the Medical Malpractice Act can be brought only by the personal representative of the
deceased's estate. For a discussion of the case, see Burke and Keleher, Civil Procedure, Survey of
New Mexico Law, 15 N.M.L. REV. 157, 172-3 (1985).
11. Keithley, 102 N.M. at 570-71, 698 P.2d at 440-41. This evidence consisted in part of Mrs.

Winter 1986]

TORTS

interesting approach since the court also noted that tolling of the statute
would not occur if the evidence demonstrated only that doctors or
hospitals
12
should have known of problems during a patient's treatment.
Finally, the court of appeals found there was a material issue of fact
about what Mrs. Keithley knew or should have known about the alleged
acts of malpractice within the three-year limitations period. For the statute
of limitations to be tolled by fraudulent concealment, Mrs. Keithley had
to establish she did not3 have the means to discover the fraud using
"reasonable diligence." Once she knew or should have known of facts
involving possible malpractice, the statute started to run again.' 4
II. TORT CLAIMS ACT
A. Substantive Developments
In another first for New Mexico jurisprudence, the supreme court in
Schear v. Board of County Commissioners5 imposed liability on police
officers for failure to respond to calls for assistance. In Schear, the complaint alleged that plaintiff was raped and tortured by an armed assailant
who broke into her house. 6 A companion of the woman, who had been
forced out by the attacker, called the Bernalillo County Sheriff's Office
for help. The only response by the sheriff's office was to try calling the
house one time. The rapist prevented the plaintiff from answering the
phone. "
The plaintiff sued the sheriff and county for gross negligence under
the Tort Claims Act.' 8 The trial court dismissed the complaint for failing
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court of appeals
upheld the trial court on the theory that although a police officer owes a
duty to the general public, he does not have a duty to each individual
who calls for help. '9 The supreme court reversed.
Keithley's affidavit that she wrote to the hospital requesting a final bill and saying that she believed
her husband had received too many radiation treatments. The hospital's only response was to say
no additional charges were due. Deposition testimony showed that doctors regularly reviewed patient
records and could calculate amounts of radiation delivered. Mrs. Keithley's experts stated that errors
were "immediately obvious" to anyone with experience in the field.
12. Id. at 571, 698 P.2d at 441.
13. Carrow v. Streeter, 410 N.E.2d 1369, 1375 (Ind. App. 1980), quoted in Keithley, 102 N.M.
at 570, 698 P.2d at 440.
14. Keithley, 102 N.M. at 572, 698 P.2d at 442.
15. 101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728 (1984).
16. Id. at 672, 687 P.2d 729; the facts of the case are set forth in Schear v. Board of County
Commissioners, 23 N.M. St. B. Bull. 192 (Ct. App., 1984).
17. 23 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 193.
18. Id. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§41-4-1 to -29 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
19. 23 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 193.
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Statutes dating back to 1921 set out the duties of police officers in
New Mexico.2" The courts traditionally held officers owed their duty only
to the general public. Thus, no private cause of action arose from an
officer's failure to perform them. The only way the police could be liable
for a Schear-type claim was if the officer voluntarily assumed a duty
toward the injured party. 2'
The supreme court in Schear found the public/private duty distinction
a "ghost of sovereign immunity . . . inconsistent with Hicks v. State and
Section 41-4-2(B) of the Tort Claims Act." 22 Although it held the complaint stated a valid cause of action, the court explicitly explained it was
not imposing strict liability against officers for failing to respond. To
recover the plaintiff still would have to show the inaction was a proximate
cause of her damages.23
A city's animal control center succeeded where the Schear defendants
failed in claiming sovereign immunity. In Redding v. City of Truth or
Consequences,24 the plaintiff sued under the "medical facilities" section
of the Act 25 for the negligent release of a vicious cat which bit the
plaintiff. 26 The court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment. An animal control center, even
though operated for public health purposes, is not a medical facility for
which immunity is waived under the Act. 27 The court assumed defendant
owed a duty to plaintiff, but no applicable waiver of immunity could be
shown by plaintiff and, thus, no liability arose. 28 Redding bears out Pro20. The original version of N.M. STAT. ANN. §29-1-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984), which expresses
those duties, was enacted in 1981 N.M. Laws, ch. 170, § 1.
21. See Doe v. Hendricks, 92 N.M. 499, 590 P.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1979), which illustrates the
effect of the distinction between private and public duties. There a police officer failed to respond
to a call reporting an assault on a 12-year-old boy in an abandoned house. The court of appeals
found no liability because the officer's duty was to the public only and fell within the 1973 Peace
Officers Liability Act. That Act provided sovereign immunity from personal liability for police
officers in the conduct of their duties and was expressly repealed by the Tort Claims Act. 1976 N.M.
Laws, ch. 58, § 27.
22. 101 N.M. at 677, 687 P.2d at 734; Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975),
abolished sovereign immunity to tort liability; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-2(B) applies the ordinary care
standard of tort liability for governmental entities.
23. 101 N.M. at 676, 687 P.2d at 733.
24. 102 N.M. 226, 693 P.2d 594 (Ct. App. 1984).
25. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-9 (Repl. Pamp. 1982). N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-9 reads, in pertinent
part:
The immunity granted pursuant to Subsection A of Section 41-4-4 N.M.S.A.
1978 does not apply to liability for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful
death or property damage caused by the negligence of public employees while
acting within the scope of their duties in the operation of any hospital, infirmary,
mental institution, clinic, dispensary, medical care home or like facilities.
26. 102 N.M. at 227, 693 P.2d at 595.
27. Id. at 228, 693 P.2d at 596.
28. Id. Redding makes no mention of public duty. Judge Bivins, who wrote the Redding opinion,
also wrote the earlier court of appeals opinion in Schear which followed the public duty reasoning
of Hendricks and was reversed by the supreme court.
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fessor Ruth Kovnat's 1976 prediction that "litigation [will be] prolonged
by argument about whether an activity is included within the [Act's]
categories." 29
B. ProceduralDevelopments
A statute of limitations case, The Regents of the University of New
Mexico v. Armijo,3° arose from the death of a two-day-old infant. The
mother filed an action for medical malpractice and wrongful death threeand-a-half years later, both on her own behalf and as personal representative of the estate of her deceased child. She claimed malpractice by the
doctor and the University of New Mexico Hospital, misrepresentation by
the Regents as to the quality of the medical care available at the hospital,
and fraudulent concealment of the facts surrounding the death of her
child.31
The trial court granted a summary judgment for the defendants on the
grounds the statute of limitations had run.32 The court of appeals reversed
the trial court in part, holding that while the statute of limitations had
run on the mother's suit,33 it had not run on the child's. The supreme
court held summary judgment for the defendants was proper on the claim
of the child's estate as well.34
The primary issue in the case involved the application of the section
of the Tort Claims Act which generally requires suits against governmental
entities to be filed within two years of the occurrence resulting in the
loss." The Act excepts minors under the age of seven from this requirement.36 The court of appeals concluded the suit filed on behalf of the
child's estate was valid under this exception, even though it was filed
more than two years after the occurrence. It reasoned the Tort Claims
Act did not differentiate between a claim based on a child's death and a
child's injury. Thus, the exception allowed suit by the estate for the death
claim.37
The supreme court reversed in a 3-2 opinion. The court noted statutes
29. Kovnat, Torts: Sovereign and Governmental Immunity in New Mexico, 6 N.M.L. REV. 249,
268 (1976), quoted in Scales, Torts, Survey of New Mexico Law, 12 N.M.L. REV. 481, 497 (1982).
30. 103 N.M. 174, 704 P.2d 428 (1985).
31. Id. at 175, 704 P.2d at 429.
32. Id.
33. Armijo v. Regents of the University of New Mexico, 103 N.M. 183, 186-87, 704 P.2d 437,
440-41 (Ct. App. 1984).
34. Armijo, 103 N.M. at 174, 704 P.2d at 429. Certiorari was originally granted on both issues.
The plaintiff's petition, however, was subsequently quashed. 103 N.M. 147, 704 P.2d 431 (1985).
35. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-4-15(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1982). It provides, in pertinent part:
Actions against a governmental entity or a public employee for torts shall be
forever barred, unless such action is commenced within two years after the date
of occurrence resulting in loss, injury or death, except that a minor under the full
age of seven years shall have until his ninth birthday in which to file.
36. Id.
37. Armijo, 103 N.M. at 186, 704 P.2d at 440.
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of limitation are to be strictly construed, so minority savings clauses are
enacted "to allow time for the full scope of the child's injury to become
apparent, to enable the child to become competent to testify, or to allow
the child to act for herself after the disability has been removed . . .
Clearly, none of these reasons are applicable when the minor dies." 38
The mother's individual claim had been for pain and suffering and the
loss of the companionship of her child. The court of appeals upheld this
portion of the summary judgment and ruled she could not tack her cause
of action on to that of her child. The mother's fallback position was that
fraudulent concealment about the cause of her child's death tolled the
running of the statute on her claim."
The court of appeals stated the fraudulent concealment doctrine could
operate in a tort claims action to toll the running of the statute of limitations, but said summary judgment had been proper because the mother
could not indicate what specific facts were concealed by the hospital.
She failed to "raise a factual issue as to false representations on the part
of defendants, or as to the silence of defendants concerning material
facts" about her child's death. The mother abandoned her individual claim
after the court of appeals decision.'
City of Las Cruces v. Garcia4 concerned the notice provisions of the
Tort Claims Act, which require written notice to certain officials within
90 days after the occurrence as a pre-condition to the suit.42 Actual notice
of the occurrence to the responsible agency can overcome the written
notice requirement.4 3 The Garcia plaintiff, who received injuries in a
traffic accident, sued the City of Las Cruces and the State as the entities
responsible for maintaining street intersections." Even though the city
traffic department had received the police accident report, the trial court
38. Id. at 176, 704 P.2d at 430, citing Slade v. Slade, 81 N.M. 462, 468 P.2d 627 (1970).
39. Id. at 186-87, 704 P.2d at 440-41; any rights originating from a disability are personal and
cannot be asserted in another's claim.
40. Id. at 188, 704 P.2d at 442. The court of appeals provides an extensive list of factual
information available to the plaintiff during the statutory period; cf. supra, notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
41. 102 N.M. 25, 690 P.2d 1019 (1984).
42. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-16 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
43. Id. §41-4-16(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
44. The case against the state is not specifically addressed in the appellate opinions. See, Garcia
v. City of Las Cruces, 23 N.M. St. B. Bull. 479 (Ct. App. May 3, 1984). The court of appeals
also rejected plaintiff's "incapacity" theory; he had argued his written notice was timely because it
was filed within 180 days after the accident, and his incapacity due to his injuries had prevented
him from giving it within the original 90 days. Under the Act, incapacity of an injured party can
give him an additional 90 days to give his written notice. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-16(B). The court
found that no matter what definition of "incapacity" it looked to-the term is not defined in the
Act-plaintiff could not prevail since he had been able to "comprehend the situation and look after
his interests . . ." despite his injuries. 23 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 480-81.
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granted summary judgment for both the city and the state. The court of
appeals, however, reversed the summary judgment for the city and held
receipt of the police report by its traffic department constituted actual
notice."
The supreme crout granted certiorari for the city's portion of the case
and reinstated summary judgment for Las Cruces. The supreme court
confirmed earlier rulings that a report can be "actual notice" under the
Act only if it "puts the governmental entity allegedly at fault on notice
that there is a claim against it."'46 The police report only informed the
city of an occurrence, not a claim, and could not be actual notice.
III. OTHER TORT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Negligent Entrustment
McCarson v. Foreman Oil Co.,47 a negligent entrustment case, was
filed following a fatal highway accident. The court of appeals examined
the effect of evidence of prior drug and traffic arrests, citations, or plea
bargains on a claim of negligent entrustment defined by the trial court's
jury instructions.4"
One McCarson defendant was the principal owner of the company and
responsible for overseeing his truck drivers. The other defendant, his
adult son, was an employee of the company and had unrestricted use of
a company truck. The accident occurred in September 1981 after the son
had been drinking at a friend's party. Although he left the picnic driving
the truck, he claimed a hitchhiker was driving at the time of the accident.4 9
The trial court admitted evidence of the son's general drinking habits,
speeding tickets before the accident, and a prior conviction for DWI in
September 1980. This evidence included a January 1981 arrest for trafficking in cocaine and an October 1982 plea agreement in which the
trafficking charge was reduced to possession.50
The court of appeals affirmed judgment for the plaintiff. It held neg45. 23 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 482.
46. Garcia, 102 N.M. at 27, 690 P.2d at 1021 (emphasis in original).
47. 27 N.M. St. B. Bull. 69 (Ct. App., 1985).
48. The jury instructions on the elements of negligent entrustment were not challenged. Id. at
71. Accordingly, the court did not decide the elements of negligent entrustment for New Mexico.
Id. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 308 (1965) was quoted as the source of the theory of

negligent entrustment. 24 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 72. It provides:
It is negligence to permit a third person to use a thing or to engage in an activity
which is under the control of the actor, if the actor knows or should know that
such person intends or is likely to use the thing or to conduct himself in the
activity in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others.
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 308, at 100 (1965). 24 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 70.
50. Id. at 70, 73.
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ligent entrustment may exist if an entrustor knows, or should know, the
driver is likely to use the car in a manner creating a risk of harm to
others." Under the doctrine, both the son's fitness as a driver and the
father's knowledge of the son's fitness were fact questions2 The court
of appeals determined that the evidence was admissible because these
"prior specific acts" were relevant to the son's fitness and the father's
knowledge of it. Defendants argued that the DWI conviction was the only
3
item which concerned the son's ability to operate a vehicle safely.
Even if the father had not been aware of his son's social habits, "a
jury was entitled to find that lack of knowledge . . . was an aspect of
the father's negligence" in his role as owner of the company and overseer
of the company vehicles.' Plaintiff did not have to prove the father knew
the son was intoxicated at the time of the accident. The plaintiff only had
to establish that it was or should have been foreseeable to the father,
because of the son's past conduct, that the son was "likely to become
drunk or otherwise unfit at anytime.""
B. Negligent Hiring and Retention
In Pittard v. The FourSeasons Motor Inn, Inc.,56 the court of appeals
determined a hotel owner may be liable for an employee's attack on a
person visiting a hotel guest, even if the employee acted outside the scope
of his employment at the time. The Pittardemployee sexually assaulted
57
a boy at the hotel where the boy's grandparents were registered guests.
Prior to this incident the hotel fired the employee from his position as a
dishwasher because he had been drinking at work. He also had been
removed forcibly from the hotel when he showed up drunk to ask for his
job back and got into a fight in the kitchen. Nonetheless, shortly before
the attack on the boy, he was rehired as a steward. 8 By his own admission,
he was drunk and still drinking when the attack occurred.
Plaintiffs won reversal of a directed verdict for the hotel on a theory
of negligent hiring and retention. 9 The Pittard decision paralleled the
51. Id. at 72.
52. Id. at 71.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 73.
55. Id.
56. 101 N.M. 723, 688 P.2d 333 (Ct. App. 1984).
57. Id. at 726, 688 P.2d at 336.
58. Id. at 730, 688 P.2d at 340.
59. In dicta the court indicated that plaintiff also might have prevailed on a second theory-that
of the negligence of the proprietor of business premises. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 344 (1965) imposes liability "for physical harm caused by . . . acts of third persons . . . and by
failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care to (a) discover that such acts ... are likely ...
or (b) to give warning." Id. "Third persons" would include employees of the proprietor, but plaintiffs
here failed to preserve the issue by not tendering proper jury instructions on this theory. Pittard,
101 N.M. at 728, 688 P.2d at 338.
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conclusion reached in McCarson, that the defendant would not have to
foresee the specific event giving rise to the lawsuit to be liable. For the
negligent hiring and retention claim to be submitted to the jury, the
evidence only had to indicate the hotel should have foreseen "some
general harm ... or consequence" '

to third persons if it rehired the

employee who committed the act. In determining whether the directed
verdict was proper, the court looked at all the evidence available to the
hotel about the employee's past conduct. 6
The court also pointed out that as a steward, one of the employee's
duties was to help with the preparation of banquets, which involved
contact with patrons and access to alcohol. Since earlier incidents of the
employee's intoxication and violence had occurred at the hotel, the court
concluded the sexual assault case should have been submitted to the jury.62
C. Fireman'sRule
In Moreno v. Marrs,3 another case of first impression in New Mexico,
the court of appeals held a property owner has a duty to warn firemen
of hidden perils on his land. The "fireman's rule" duty arises from a
combination of four elements: where a hazard is (1) hidden and (2) not
known or observable by the firemen, and the landowner (3) knows of the
hazard and (4) has an opportunity to warn of the danger. 64 If all the
elements are present, the landowner may be liable if he fails to warn.
The landowner also has a duty not to misrepresent a known hazard.65
In Moreno, volunteer firemen were injured by toxic chemical fumes
while fighting a fire at defendant's warehouse. Defendant argued he was
not liable because plaintiffs had assumed the risk of firefighting. The court
confirmed there can be no recovery by a fireman for injuries received in
the knowing confrontation of a hazard.' Since there was conflicting
testimony about plaintiff's knowledge of hazards and about defendant's
warning, summary judgment for defendant was reversed by the court of
appeals. The court also rejected the argument that defendant should be
liable because the presence of the chemicals constituted a nuisance and
60. Pittard, 101 N.M. at 730, 688 P.2d at 340.
61. Id. The court rejected the application of strict liabillity against employers sued for the acts
of employees in a negligent hiring or retention case. Id. at 728-29, 688 P.2d at 338-39. The Pittard
plaintiffs also argued innkeepers should be held to a higher standard than ordinary care, by analogy
to the traditional requirement that common carriers or innkeepers assure the comfort and safety of
their guests. The court pointed out "New Mexico... applies in all cases an 'ordinary care' standard."
Id. at 729, 688 P.2d at 339, quoting N.M. U.J.I. Civ. 6.5 (Repl. Pamp. 1980).
62. Id. at 731, 688 P.2d at 341.
63. 102 N.M. 373, 695 P.2d 1322 (Ct. App. 1984).
64. Id. at 378, 695 P.2d at 1327 (quoting Clark v. Corby, 249 N.W.2d 567, 570 (Wis., 1977)).
65. Moreno, 102 N.M. at 378, 695 P.2d at 1327, (quoting Lipson v. Superior Court of Orange
County 644 P.2d 822, 828-29, 182 Cal. Rptr. 629, 635-36 (1982)).
66. Id.
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limited any theory of liabilty to the duty to warn or not to misrepresent
the conditions on the property.67
D. Release Act
In Gonzales v. Atnip,6" the court of appeals held that the Release Act
did not invalidate an oral settlement of a personal injury suit when the
settlement was reached after the filing of the lawsuit by attorneys who
had specific authority from their clients to do so. The Release Act allows
disavowal of "any" settlement agreement made while the claimant is
under medical care, if the agreement is not obtained according to the
Act's requirements of notice and acknowledgment.69 The Gonzales plaintiff wanted a settlement set aside because he had not realized he still
7°
needed medical care and had "just made a mistake" in agreeing to it.
He urged an unconditional reading of the act so "any settlement agreement" would refer to "all" settlement agreements. 7'
The dispute stemmed from a 1982 lawsuit plaintiff filed for injuries
received in a 1981 traffic accident. The attorneys settled the case in 1984.
That agreement was reached by the attorneys only after Gonzales had
approved the terms.72 Gonzales made no allegations of unfair practices
by the other party, he simply changed his mind about the settlement.
Plaintiff attempted to avoid the agreement, and defendants moved for
enforcement.73
The court of appeals assumed the plaintiff was still receiving medical
care at the time of the settlement and the treatment was reasonably required
and provided in good faith.74 The court still found the agreement enforceable even though the statutory provisions for obtaining the release
had not been followed. It delineated three reasons for the decision. First,
67. Id. at 379-80, 695 P.2d at 1328-29.
68. 102 N.M. 194, 692 P.2d 1343 (Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 102 N.M. 225, 693 P.2d 591
(1985).
69. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§41-1-1 to -2 (Repl. Pamp. 1982). N.M. STAT. ANN. §§41-1-1(B) and
-2 provide in pertinent part:
Any settlement agreement . . . made by any person who is under the care of a
person licensed to practice the healing arts or is confined in a hospital . . . which
is not obtained in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 . . . may be
disavowed by the injured person.
The provisions of this act . . . shall not apply, if at least five days prior to
obtaining the settlement, release or statement, the injured party has signified in
writing [and] acknowledged . . . his willingness that a settlement, release or
statement be given.
70. 102 N.M. at 197, 692 P.2d at 1346.
71. Id. at 198, 692 P.2d at 1347.
72. Id. at 196, 692 P.2d at 1345.
73. Id. at 195, 692 P.2d at 1344.
74. Id. at 197, 692 P.2d at 1346.
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the court reasoned that the Act's purpose is to prevent unfair settlements."7
There was no evidence here the settlement was unfair. The case had been
in progress for 18 months; extensive discovery had been done. Second,
the court determined that the New Mexico constitutional guarantee of
judicial control over court procedures would be jeopardized if the Release
Act applied to every settlement.76 Here depositions and a trial setting
were vacated as a result of the settlement. Trial courts could not control
docketing and case disposition without the power to determine the validity
of agreements. Finally, the court found that limitations had already been
placed on the applicability of the Act in Bolles v. Smith.7 Where judgment
or dismissal has followed settlement, the Act cannot be used to set aside
the settlement. The court read Bolles to mean that an enforceable agreement which does not thwart the Act's purposes cannot be disavowed.7"
E. Negligent Failureto Settle
In a case certified from the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, the
New Mexico Supreme Court held allegations of an insurance carrier's
negligent failure to settle a claim against its insured failed to state a cause
of action.79 In Ambassador Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine
Insurance Co., 0 the excess carrier sued the primary carrier for negligently
failing to accept a settlement offer within the limits of the primary medical
malpractice policy.
The court relied, in part, on dicta from another supreme court decision
to find sound policy reasons for not recognizing plaintiff's cause of action. 8 Insurers and their policyholders have only a contractual relationship, so both are obligated only to perform the terms of the contract and
to deal with each other in good faith.82 Accordingly, in deciding whether
75. Id. at 198-99, 692 P.2d at 1347-48.
76. Id.at 198, 692 P.2d 1347.
77. 92 N.M. 524, 591 P.2d 278 (1979). The court pointed out that these limitations arose largely
from the lack of clear legislative intent in the Act and urged clarification. Gonzales, 102 N.M. at
200, 692 P.2d at 1349.
78. Gonzales, 102 N.M. at 200, 692 P.2d at 1349.
79. Ambassador Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 102 N.M. 28, 690 P.2d
1022 (1984). The case was certified pursuant to N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-8 (1978).
80. 102 N.M. 28, 690 P.2d 1022 (1984).
81. The court quoted from American Employer's Insurance Co. v. Crawford, 87 N.M. 375, 380,
533 P.2d 1203, 1208 (1975):
Clearly, the company violated no contractual obligation to Crawford, and we fail
to understand the source or nature of any duty recognized in the law of tort which
the company owed or breached. (Emphasis added in Ambassador, 102 N.M. at
29, 690 P.2d at 1023.)
82. Ambassador, 102 N.M. at 30, 690 P.2d at 1024. The only duty contractually imposed on the
insurer is the duty to defend the suit. Id. Thus, it is the insurer's decision whether to settle. New
Mexico, however, recognizes the implied covenant of fair dealing which creates a duty of good
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to settle a case or take it to trial, insurers must balance their own interests
against those of the insured and protect both evenhandedly.83 An insurer
should not be penalized for good faith efforts to reduce its liability and
that of the insured by trying a case. The risks inherent in any trial can
defeat either party's case, and neither side should be required to settle
because of the possibility of losing in the courtroom.84
The court stated that negligence in defending a case for an insured can
be strong evidence of bad faith on the part of the company, but negligence
without bad faith does not state a cause of action." Failure to prepare
for the case properly can constitute negligence, but only as an element
of proof in a bad faith claim.
It should be noted in this context that 1984 changes in the Insurance
Code86 create a private right of action for unfair or deceptive practices
against insurance companies. The statute allows the claim to be brought
by "any person covered by this article [Article 16] who has suffered
damages." 87 The change is important because two earlier cases 88 found
third parties-for instance persons not parties to the contract for insurance
suing the insured-had no private cause of action for these types of claims.
These earlier cases may be overruled by the new code provision.
F. New Mexico's (Short-Lived) Seatbelt Defense
In Thomas v. Henson,89 the court of appeals adopted the "seatbelt
defense" as a means of apportioning plaintiff's damages in automobile
accident cases. Plaintiff was injured in an accident and defendant was
found 100% at fault by the jury. The trail court refused to admit defendants' proffered evidence of plaintiffs' failure to use seatbelts. 9
The court of appeals upheld judgment for the plaintiff, but prospectively
faith. Id. (citing State Farm General Insurance Co. v. Clifton, 86 N.M. 757, 527 P.2d 798 (1974);
State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Price, 101 N.M. 438, 684 P.2d 524 (Ct. App. 1984); Chavez
v. Chenoweth, 89 N.M. 423, 533 P.2d 703 (Ct. App. 1976); Lujan v. Gonzales, 84 N.M. 229, 501
P.2d 673 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 84 N.M. 219, 501 P.2d 663 (1972)).
83. Ambassador, 102 N.M. at 32, 690 P.2d at 1025 (quoting Radcliffe v. Franklin National
Insurance Co., 208 Or. 1, 33, 298 P.2d 1002, 1017 (1956), quoting Hilker v. Western Automobile
Insurance Co., 204 Wis. 1, 14, 235 N.W. 413, 415 (1931)).
84. Ambassador, 102 N.M. at 30, 690 P.2d at 1024.
85. Id. at 31, 690 P.2d at 1025.
86. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§59A-16-1 to -30 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
87. Id. §59A-16-30.
88. See Patterson v. Globe American Casualty Co., 101 N.M. 541, 685 P.2d 396 (Ct. App. 1984)
(no provision in Unfair Insurance Practices Act for private action against insurer by non-party to
contract); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Price, 101 N.M. 438, 684 P.2d 524 (Ct. App. 1984)
(no private action against insurer under Unfair Insurance Practices Act for party to personal injury
suit against insured).
89. 102 N.M. 417, 696 P.2d 1010 (Ct. App. 1984).
90. Id. at 419, 696 P.2d at 1012.
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adopted a seatbelt defense for New Mexico. 9' It held that even where a
plaintiff's negligence does not contribute to the accident, plaintiff's damages may be limited if his injuries are increased because he was not
protecting himself by wearing a seatbelt.92 The court reviewed voluminous
case law and commentary in reaching its decision, finding at least four
different versions of the defense in other jurisdictions.93 The court determined that New Mexico's seatbelt defense would be based on the "duty
to exercise ordinary care for one's own safety."'94
The decision was reversed after the survey period.95 The supreme court,
normally so concerned about any infringement by the Legislature to preempt the judicial authority, decided it was the Legislature's privilege to
determine if the seatbelt defense should exist in New Mexico. 96 The 1985
Legislature enacted the Safety Belt Use Act97 which required use of belts
beginning January 1, 1986. The Act specifies, however, "[flailure to be
secured . . . by a safety belt as required . . . shall not in any instance

constitute fault or negligence and shall not limit or apportion damages. "98

91. Id. at 427, 696 P.2d at 1020.
92. Id. at 420, 696 P.2d at 1013.
93. Id. at 420-25, 696 P.2d at 1013-18.
94. Id. at 424, 696 P.2d at 1017 (quoting N.M. U.J.1. Civ. 16.4 (Repl. Pamp. 1980); the concept
of apportioning damages on a theory of antecedent failure to mitigate was also incorporated from
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 425 (1965)).
95. Thomas v. Henson, 102 N.M. 326, 695 P.2d 476 (1985).
96. Id. at 327, 695 P.2d at 477, see supra n. 75 and accompanying text.
97. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§66-7-370 to -73 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
98. Id. § 66-7-373.

